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ABSTRACT
While we put great effort in protecting digital devices and data,
there is a lack of research on usable techniques to secure personal
items that we carry in public space. To better understand situations
where ubiquitous technologies could help secure personal items,
we conducted an online survey (N=101) in which we collected
real-world stories from users reporting on personal items, either
at risk of, or actually being lost, damaged or stolen. We found,
for example, that the majority of cases occurred in (semi-)public
spaces during afternoon and evening times, when users left their
items. From these results, we derived a model of incidents involving
personal items in public space as well as a set of properties to
describe situations where personal items may be at risk. We discuss
reoccurring properties of the scenarios, potential multimedia-based
protection mechanisms for securing personal items in public space
as well as future research suggestions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Much of the research in usable security and privacy is based on
the assumption that attackers get physical access to users’ personal
devices, such as smartphones, tablets, or laptops. Subsequently, to
mitigate the risk of attackers gaining access to sensitive data that is
either stored on the device itself or can be accessed by means of the
device, researchers are developing an ever-increasing number of
authentication concepts [5, 20]. The main focus of these works is to
ensure that the attacker is unable to find the user’s login credentials
through, for example, shoulder surfing [6], smudge attacks [2, 16],
guessing attacks, or thermal attacks [1].
At the same time, little research exists on understanding the
context and circumstances under which personal devices are stolen.
Undisputedly, though, theft of personal items occurs frequently.
For example, in Germany about 600 smartphones are stolen every
day1. We argue that we should take a step back and first understand
how attackers get access to personal items. Attackers do not only
steal personal items to access sensitive information, but also for
monetary value (e.g., selling a stolen smartphone on the black
market). Knowledge about how attackers get access to personal
devices is valuable because by understanding such situations, we
can design better protective mechanisms to prevent theft or allow
users to find their stolen/lost items.
The objective of our research is to (a) obtain an understanding
of the context in which attackers (might) get physical access to
users’ personal devices and (b) to derive requirements for designing
mechanisms that prevent attackers from getting access to the device
in the first place. This is valuable in the context of authentication as
well: if a personal device is able to understand that it is in the hand
of an attacker, appropriate security measures could be taken, such
as switching to a secure authentication mechanism, that would
require too much effort and thus be inappropriate for daily use.
Our research approach is: Firstly, we conducted an online survey
(N=101) where we asked participants to describe in detail a situation
in which a personal item was at risk or even attacked. Secondly,
we analysed these situations for common themes and derived op-
portunities for the design of systems capable of securing personal
items in public space. Such mechanisms may involve the personal
items, the owners, or group members and/or bystanders. Thirdly
we derive open questions and opportunities for future research.
All sources were last accessed August 30, 2019
1www.presseportal.de/pm/55928/3348558
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2 BACKGROUND & RELATEDWORK
Prior work on securing personal items mainly focuses on users’ dig-
ital possessions (i.e., data), which may be protected through several
authentication factors – mainly knowledge-based, token-based, or
biometric [12]. A number of authentication mechanisms aiming
at being more secure while at the same time being more usable
have been investigated in prior work [16, 20]. Further, methods to
reduce authentication overhead have been introduced, for example,
SnapApp [3].
However, we see a a main risk in how potential attackers may
gain access to the personal item itself. 127,376 cases of pick-pocketing
were reported at German police departments in 20172. Especially
in locations such as bars, bags are particularly at risk when placed
over a chair or on the floor [17]. Some devices hence employ “anti-
theft features”, mainly addressing the issue of returning and/or
finding the device (in particular smartphones) once it got lost. Ex-
amples include Google’s find my device3 or Apple’s find my iPhone4.
Examples for securing other items include anti-theft systems for
bikes5 or security cables to lock laptops6. Moreover, patents for anti-
theft mechanisms have been granted (e.g., for portable electronic
devices [21], vehicles [14], or detection of theft or burglaries [10]).
Moreover, to securely store and carry personal items, several
protection features have been applied to bags. Examples include,
but are not limited to, the use of cut resistant, waterproof or RFID
blocking material or hidden or locking zippers (e.g., Bobby Original
Anti-Theft Backpack7, Secura® Premier Anti-Theft Satchel8).
However, while many devices already employ authentication
mechanisms, the need for ubiquitous security mechanisms for per-
sonal items as physical objects is under-investigated. Secured bags
have been proposed as a possible solution, but those still do not
actively avoid or intervene for potential attacks. With our work,
we obtain an understanding of potential attacks to guide the use of
ubiquitousmultimedia to designmore suitable securitymechanisms
for personal items.
3 ONLINE SURVEY
3.1 Design and Method
With our work, we investigate attacks and risks for personal items.
We hence decided to collect real world stories from users in an online
survey. To achieve this, we loosely followed the critical incident
technique [7] and questions were designed in such a way that both,
victims and bystanders, could report on stories. For other threats,
this methodology already provided valuable insights [6]. Note, that
there is no IRB at our institution. However, we made sure to comply
with the study, ethics and privacy regulations of our local university.
3.2 Questionnaire Structure
The questionnaire consisted of three parts (refer to Appendix A): 1)
a free text entry field for a detailed description of the scenario, 2)
2www.bundespolizei.de/Web/DE/02Sicher-im-Alltag/01Vorsicht-Taschendiebstahl/
04Statistik/statistik_node
3www.google.com/android/find,
4support.apple.com/kb/PH19297?viewlocale=en_EN
5www.indiegogo.com/projects/boomerang-v2-bike-anti-theft-safety-system
6https://www.kensington.com/p/products/security/keyed-locks/
7www.xd-design.com/us-us/bobby-anti-theft-backpack-grey
8www.lewisnclark.com/secura-rfid-blocking-anti-theft-satchel/
Gender 75 Female
25 Male
1 Not stated
Mean Age 27.93
Occupation 68 Student
26 Employee
7 Other or not stated
Nationality 92 German
9 Other or not stated
Table 1: Demographics of participants who filled our online
questionnaire (N=101).
voluntary open-ended questions about details of the scenario (e.g.,
time, location), and 3) demographic questions. We also included a
5-point Likert item about participants being honest in their answers.
Participants could fill in the questionnaire multiple times if they
had multiple scenarios to share.
3.3 Participants
We ran the survey in spring 2018 in a large German city. It was
distributed via a university mailing list and participants were self-
selected. We excluded 8 scenarios due to being not honest (i.e.,
participants did not partially or fully agree to being honest) or de-
scribing no scenario (e.g., P73: “I can’t remember such a situation”),
resulting in a total of 101 scenarios. The reported mean age was
27.93 (compare Table 1) and most participants were female (75%).
Participants were mainly students (68%) and almost all were Ger-
man (92%). Participants could win one of three e20 gift vouchers.
3.4 Limitations
Our study sample is biased towards young people, students and fe-
males. In addition we only received one scenario from the viewpoint
of an attacker. This may cause bias in our qualitative insights.
Due to our data being self-reported, our insights are limited to
parts of scenarios participants were willing to share and/or recalling
correctly and may also have been influenced by our wording [13].
Participants may also have modified their answers due to social
desirability [18]. However, we took great care to avoid bias in the
questions (e.g., we avoided the term “victim” in favour of “owner”)
and most participants indicated they were honest in their answers.
4 ANALYSIS & DATASET
4.1 Coding Process
The dataset used for analysis consisted of 101 answers; each in-
cluding a scenario description, answers to detail questions and de-
mographic information. We applied qualitative content analysis to
the descriptions as well as the detail questions. Two researchers
independently applied in-vivo coding to all answers and merged
their codes afterwards. Focused coding was applied to derive cate-
gories from the in-vivo codes (e.g., codes such as “in a backpack”
and “carried” were grouped to “item storage”). Finally, axial coding
was applied to find relations between the discovered categories. We
noticed, that categories could be associated with one of two models;
either describing properties of the environment or steps occurring
in the event of an incident. We report on both derived models in
Sections 5 (environmental properties) and 6 (incident model), respec-
tively. Participants’ quotes were translated from German.
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Time
• afternoon
• evening
• night
• noon
• forenoon
• during the day
• morning
• other
29
17
16
15
12
7
3
5
Location
• public transport
• university/work/library
• public road/place
• station/airport
• food court/bar
• city
• sports facility
• disco
• other
16
12
10
10
8
5
4
3
11
Artefacts
• smartphone
• wallet
• bag/backpack/suitcase
• bike
• clothes
• camera
• money
• laptop
• car
• keys
• other
32
29
27
14
6
4
4
3
3
3
8
Protected
• yes
• no
• other
45
43
8
Companions
• alone
• not alone
• other
53
45
2
Table 2: Properties of potentially dangerous environments
(Section 5), as found from the collected situations. Counts
indicate the number of scenarios the respective manifesta-
tion was mentioned in. For details refer to Section 4.2.1.
4.2 Results
We quantified both, scenarios and detail questions, and in this sec-
tion report on the results. For quantification, one scenario could con-
tribute to multiple manifestations in the same category if more than
one was mentioned (e.g., the manifestations “wallet” and “money”
would be separately counted towards the category “Artefacts” if
both were mentioned in one scenario). Manifestations that were
mentioned less than 3 times over all scenarios were summarised
as “other”. In cases where the manifestation of a category could not
unambiguously be determined, we marked it as “unclear”.
4.2.1 Environmental Properties. Results relating to environmental
properties are illustrated in Table 2. We found the scenarios being
relatively evenly spread over different times with a light tendency
to occurring later in the day. Except for a few cases (e.g., work), only
public places were given as locations in the scenarios. The affected
artefacts were mainly smartphones, wallets and bag-like objects.
Notice, that this includes several situations where those things
were affected simultaneously (e.g., P33: “I forgot a bag containing
my wallet on a chair in my unlocked office”). There were also a large
number of scenarios involving bikes. Scenarios were almost evenly
Action
• leave item
• have with them
• (shortly) leave unattended
• forget item
• secure item
• distraction/sleep
• accident
• other
• unclear
22
21
18
12
11
9
3
2
15
Incident
• theft
• no attack
• damage
• raid
• other
• unclear
45
25
8
3
2
20
Reaction
• emotional reaction
• none
• confront attacker
• search
• none (no incident)
• file a complaint (police)
• return to owner
• increase vigilance
• alert owner
• other
31
23
15
15
10
5
5
4
4
2
Reaction time
• delayed reaction
• instant reaction
• no reaction (no incident)
• no reaction
• unclear
40
23
10
2
25
Consequence
• none
• loss
• damage
• partial loss
• unclear
34
30
8
7
23
Table 3: Number of scenarios mentioning Phases of our in-
cident model (compare Section 6). Details in Section 4.2.2.
split between cases where personal items were protected (e.g., P55:
“My bike was stolen [...] although it was locked”) or left unsecured as
well as between the owner being alone or having companions.
4.2.2 Steps in Incident Situations. Results relating to observed steps
in incident situations are illustrated in Table 3. Our scenarios in-
cluded many situations, in which participants either left items unat-
tended (for a short duration) or where items were intentionally left
and secured (e.g., locking a bike to an object). The most common
incident was theft. In 25 cases no incident occurred (i.e. there was no
attack on personal items (e.g. theft or damage)). Many participants
described to have reacted emotionally on incidents. In some cases
the attacker was confronted or a lost item searched (15 occurrences
each). In 23 cases no reaction was shown/described. This was often-
times linked to a long reaction time, i.e., the participant only noticed
the incident after a certain delay (40 occurrences). Instant reactions
were only shown by 23 of the participants. In most cases there were
no consequences. However those cases are closely followed by a
total of 30 cases where an artefact was lost (including stolen in the
sense of lost for the owner). In some cases items were damaged or
partial loss occurred (e.g., P13: “[...] I found my ransacked bag in a
bush [...]. Except for my phone and cash everything was still there”).
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Initial Situation (Actions) Incident (Reactions) Consequences
reaction time
no incident
Figure 1: Incident model: From an initial situation an incident (i.e., an attack on a personal item/artefact) may occur. This can
either be triggered by an action (e.g., leaving an item unattended) or arise from the situation itself (e.g., crowded environment).
After an incident, the consequences ( e.g., loss of the artefact) can be influenced by the owner or bystanders according to their
reaction. This also holds if no incident occurred but a personal item was at risk nonetheless (e.g., forgotten or lost). In both
cases a further influencing factor is the reaction time, i.e., the time until a reaction is shown.
5 PROPERTIES OF POTENTIALLY
DANGEROUS ENVIRONMENTS
From the previous analysis of both, scenarios and detail questions,
we identified a set of entities, actions and properties to describe
potentially dangerous environments.
5.1 Entities
5.1.1 Actors. As actors we describe all people who can influence
the situation by taking an action or remaining passive. We observed
three groups of possible actors: The victim or owner, the (potential)
attacker(s) and bystanders, with both attackers and bystanders being
either acquaintances, strangers or both (multiple bystanders). No-
tice how also the absence of actors (e.g., no attacker) and the number
of people can influence the situation (e.g., bystander effect [9]).
5.1.2 Artefacts. Under the term “artefacts” we collect the set of
possibly endangered personal items. Those can be described by
their type (e.g., purse or phone), value (monetary or sentimental)
and storage (e.g., backpack, carried etc.). The latter also includes
measures taken to protect the item (e.g., attaching a lock).
5.2 Actions
All actors can influence the current situation by performing either
actions or reactions. In this context we also consider taking no
(re)action (e.g., ignoring an incident) as a (re)action. Notice, how
actions taken can be influenced both by the current environment as
well as the acting party’s mental model. This includes assumptions
(e.g., P3: “We expected that during daytime [...] nobody would try to
steal something”) and habits that lead to a certain behaviour.
5.3 Environmental Properties
Apart from the entities and the actions taken, the environment itself
has properties that may influence the situation as well as the actors’
mental model. Those include the time (e.g., P3: “[...] daytime (it was
noon/early afternoon) [...]”),weather (e.g., P85: “in a cold winter night
[...]”), location and semantic context (e.g., vacation, parties). There
may be more contextual factors having an influence (e.g., Schmidt
et al. [15]) that we did not observe in our sample.
6 INCIDENT MODEL
From the reported scenarios we derived a model of incidents (Fig. 1),
consisting of three main phases with transitions between; allowing
for optional actions and reactions. In this section we provide further
detail about those phases and their interplay.
6.1 Initial situation
The initial situation is the prerequisite for an incident. It can be
described via the properties of potentially dangerous environments
(compare Section 5). Depending on the initial situation and actions
taken, different incidents are possible.
6.2 Actions
Starting from the initial situation, an incident can happen due to
the owner putting an artefact at risk (e.g., P95: “The mobile of our
exchange pupil was stolen from her backpack at a lake. She was
in the water at that time”). In other cases, no action is required
and an incident can arise from the situation itself without active
involvement of the owner (e.g., P63: “A man asked me for the time
and I read it frommy clock. Suddenly he approached me and embraced
me for giving the answer while at the same time searching the pockets
of my jacket for valuables.”). Finally it is also possible that a user’s
action does not lead to an incident (i.e., an active attack) but only
puts items at risk (e.g., P9: “After paying we left the building and I
accidentally left my phone [...] There was a risk that one of the visitors
would steal my phone. Luckily nothing happened”).
6.3 Incident
We only consider a situation an “incident” in case an actual attack
happened or was attempted. This includes for example theft, rob-
bery and damage to objects. Notice, however, that the absence of
an attack does not necessarily imply that there are no negative
consequences (e.g., P107: “I once slipped on an icy sidewalk [...] and
the phone in my pocket was damaged when I fell”).
6.4 Reactions
After an incident, there is another window of opportunity for reac-
tions by all actors. While the attacker may try to secure the item
or retreat from the situation, both owner and bystanders have the
opportunity to intervene (e.g., by stopping the attacker or draw the
owner’s attention to a forgotten item, e.g., P29: “Forgot phone on
the bar when getting pizza from a good restaurant. Another client
alerted the personnel and handed it over.”). Both, for actions and
reactions, the reaction time may influence the outcome (e.g., in case
of damage, intervention may not be possible shortly afterwards or
returning to a forgotten item may be too late).
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Figure 2: Co-occurrence of situational properties (left) and phases in our incidentmodel (right) with potential consequences (y-
axis) for situations with (attempted) theft. First line indicates overall co-occurrence of theft with all properties, the following
lines denote the outcomes of situations with (attempted) theft w.r.t all properties (refer to Appendix B, Fig. 3 for full list).
6.5 Consequences
Depending on the previous factors, the situation may result in one
of several outcomes. Consequences can be divided in cases where
factual damage or loss occurred (e.g., P44: “My bike was stolen”) and
situations in which damage could be averted (e.g., P87: “[...] A man
managed to grab in her backpack. [...] She turned and loudly said
“Hey!”. The man walked away and immediately left the subway [...]”
or the initial state restored (e.g., P8: “[...] both students managed to
repair the plug, so that the incident had no negative consequences.” ).
7 DESIGN OPPORTUNITIES
In prior sections we described properties and sequence of events
for situations in which incidents involving personal belongings
occurred or were probable. In this section, we elaborate on some
reoccurring patterns in those scenarios and, based on those, discuss
design opportunities for possible security mechanisms.
7.1 Don’t Forget Me: Items remind Owners
In our results, we found multiple scenarios in which users left
their personal items unattended, accidentally as well as intently
(compare Table 3, category Action). This may be due to a lack of
awareness (e.g., P35: “After having lived in Japan for a while - where
it is common to leave personal belongings [...] to reserve spots [...]
- I habitually left my wallet on the table several times [...]”), false
optimism (e.g., P12: “There was a sign indicating that no liability
is accepted [...], but of course one would not expect something to be
taken away”) or urgent reasons (e.g., P62: “I left my bag in the train
and went for the toilet”). However we found that instantly reacting
to an incident often allowed for loss to be prevented, whereas loss
occurred more often in situations where the owner reacted with a
delay (compare Fig. 2, category reaction time).
Multimedia-based solutions can help by intervening before or
after an item is left (cf. our model, Fig. 1). For instance, context
detection can be used to assess the initial situation, predict potential
risks (e.g., based on collected incident data) or media can be used
to increase awareness in general. A possible security mechanism
for personal items could also detect situations in which items were
left behind or unattended to foster reactions, e.g. using proximity
sensing technology like Bluetooth. As a result, sound or mobile
notifications can be used to draw the owner’s attention, hopefully
leading them to take their personal belongings and/or increase their
awareness for future, similar situations.
7.2 One For All and All For One: Involving
Bystanders and Group Members
We encountered several scenarios of users being in groups (i.e., at
least two people) when facing situations where personal items were
at risk (about half of participants stated to not be “alone”, compare
Table 2, category Companions and more cases of loss occurring in
groups, compare Fig. 2, category Companions). Hence, we envision
possible security mechanisms for personal items could at least
address one of the group members to not only secure their own,
but also the others’ items. Moreover, in situations where the group
is small, but bystanders are present, a security mechanism could
involve them to protect personal items (assuming that bystanders
are trusted parties). To enrich the motivation to take care of others’
belongings (i.e., increase security of each and everyone’s items), a
reward system could be developed.
As an example, such situations often happen on trains: a passen-
ger wants to leave the seat with personal items (e.g., P89: “owner
has to go to the toilet and leaves backpack on their seat on the train.”).
Hence, they may ask fellow travellers to look after their belongings.
This not only calms absent owners, but also warns bystanders and
potential attackers. Possible rewards for helpful fellow passengers
may include, but are not limited to, free seat reservations or coffee.
7.3 Summary
To summarise, we see multiple starting points for security mech-
anisms protecting personal items, namely (1) the artefacts them-
selves, (2) the owners, and (3) group members and/or bystanders.
8 FURTHER RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
Based on the previous considerations we see the following aspects
to consider in future research to a) gain a deeper understanding /
validating our current model of potentially dangerous situations
and b) investigate possible security mechanisms for personal items.
8.1 Understanding Critical Situations
To gain insights with regards to potentially dangerous situations, we
conducted an online survey. For more in-depth insights, interviews
could provide more details about scenarios. However, self-reported
data may be subjective and/or biased. Further research could hence
consider more “objective” approaches, including, but not limited to,
observations in-the-wild or in-depth analysis of crime statistics.
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8.2 Designing Security Mechanisms
8.2.1 Context Detection. As a prerequisite for interventions or acti-
vating potential security mechanisms, a system requires knowledge
about it’s context. We envision such systems to detect the context
and environment, in particular with respect to the properties we de-
scribe in Section 5. This could be used to identify critical situations
and nudge users to take measures against potential attackers.
8.2.2 Sensitivity. For potential security mechanisms it is important
to strike a good balance between reacting overly sensitive to non-
threatening situations (e.g., a legitimate user opening their bag)
and not reacting in the case of a real incident. It also remains to
be investigated what behaviour users would expect (e.g., overly
sensitive vs rather relaxed) and how to best match this.
8.2.3 Protection. Adding protection to artefacts can potentially
prevent incidents (e.g., P3: ‘Retrospectively, all valuables could have
been securely stored in a locker [to prevent the incident].”). However
we also saw a high occurrence of loss for items that were protected
(compare Fig. 2). Further research might explore which kinds of
protections are effective and how to nudge users to use them.
8.2.4 Intervention. An open question is the appropriate reaction or
intervention of a technical solution in case of a detected attack. From
the scenarios, we find confronting the attacker or alerting the owner
of an item to be common (compare Table 3, category "Reaction")
and successful (compare Fig. 2) approaches. Further exploration
can be done towards transferring this to technical solutions, e.g.,
sending a notification or nudging bystanders to intervene.
From a safety perspective there is also the question whether or
not in certain situations an intervention should take place at all,
as it can impose an actual safety risk, e.g., as stated by P2: “[After
the incident] my mother realised, that things could have gone way
differently if [the attackers] would have been armed.”). For such cases,
covert interventions might be further investigated.
8.2.5 Communication & Awareness. Following up on using inter-
ventions, another open question is communicating threats. There
are several options for technical actors to realise communication.
However, traditional methods like alarms (e.g., at cars) may be in-
sufficient as bystanders cannot decide if the alarm was triggered by
chance or due to an actual attack (see also Sensitivity above). This
leaves room for further exploration for effective output modalities
and communication interfaces (cf. security indicators [8, 11, 19]).
8.2.6 Consequences. As a result of an attack, a security mechanism
could still be useful by helping to cope with whatever happened
(e.g., repair damage, search for forgotten devices9). However, further
research should investigate if this is desired by users (i.e., victims
of attacks on personal items).
9 DISCUSSION
9.1 Potentially Dangerous Situations
In our reports, we found reoccurring characteristics of situations in
which incidents happened. These included crowded locations (e.g.,
subways) or (semi-) public spaces where items were left unattended
9e.g., www.njoiii.com/the-attic-loft/
(e.g., swimming at lakes). This knowledge may serve further re-
search in multiple ways. On one hand, it can be used to understand
potentially dangerous situations and inform the design of usable
mechanisms to protect personal belongings in such scenarios. On
the other hand, the introduced vocabulary can be used to describe
more situations, similar to those collected in this work, and the
given dimensions can be a starting point for further exploration.
9.2 Reasons for Incidents
We found that incidents may happen due to several reasons, both
with and without the (active) involvement of the legitimate owner.
Some participants reported they left items unattended. In other
scenarios, participants did not do anything in particular (e.g., park-
ing their car, leaving their bike locked) or were just present at a
certain location. In this work, we provide a model (refer to Section
6) to better understand how incidents happen and at which points
a (technical) intervention is possible. This serves to inform further
mechanisms to aid users protect their belongings, as any or all steps
in the event chain can be addressed to counteract potential threats.
9.3 When and How to Secure CRAVED Items
Our results align with previous work stating that items attract-
ing thieves oftentimes fulfil the CRAVED acronym: concealable,
removable, available, valuable, enjoyable and disposable [4]. Namely
we found many cases in which smartphones and wallets being
“CRAVED” were actually stolen (compare Fig. 2, category artefact).
While these items may be valuable and enjoyable by design, we see
great potential in designing security mechanisms that protect items
from being removable. After all, researchers should consider that
the multimedia protection mechanism is not more expensive than
the item at question.
10 CONCLUSION
With this work, we take first steps to obtain an understanding of
situations in which personal items are at risk and why this is the
case. We conducted an online survey (N=101), where we collected
real world stories from users’ personal items being exposed to inci-
dents like theft or damage or generally at risk. From the reported
scenarios, we derived a) properties of potentially dangerous en-
vironments and b) an incident model. We suggest opportunities
for designing security mechanisms for personal items and discuss
directions for future research. We hope our work to be useful for
further investigating threats on personal items as well as support
designers and practitioners building usable security mechanisms.
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A QUESTIONNAIRE
A.1 Part 1 Scenario
(1) Please describe, with as much detail as possible, a situation
that you experienced yourself, which endangered a personal
item. Relevant are situations in which personal items got
either stolen or damaged, especially also situations where
only the opportunity existed. You could have either been the
owner of the item or merely observed the owner.
A.2 Part 2 Detail questions
(1) What item was the focus of the scenario?
(2) Who was the owner of the item?
(3) Was the owner alone or in a group?
(4) At which location did the scenario happen?
(5) How familiar was the owner with the location of the sce-
nario?
(6) How many and which people (e.g., friends, neutral, active or
passive observers, attacker) where present?
(7) Describe the behaviour/the activity of the owner and the
other people present.
(8) Did the owner take any precautions to protect the item? If
so which?
(9) During which time of the day did the scenario occur?
(10) Do you think the owner had knowledge of the risk or did
gain knowledge during the scenario?
(11) How did the owner and the people present react?
A.3 Part 3 Personal questions
(1) Gender (male/female/own answer)
(2) Age
(3) Nationality
(4) Occupation
(5) I was totally honest with my answers during this question-
naire (five point Likert scale)
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Figure 3: Co-occurrence of situational properties (left) and phases in our incident model (right) with incidents (y-axis, bold).
Below each incident is the threeway co-occurrence of property, incident and consequence. As an example: the first cell denotes
the number of scenarios where theft happened while the item was protected (i.e. theft and protected co-occurred). The cells
below illustrate the number of scenarios for each potential outcome (consequence) of this situation (i.e. mostly loss in this
case).
